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"Green" Language in the NAFTA:
Reconciling Free Trade and
Environmental Protection
The complex legal regimes governing environmental protection and interna-
tional trade evolved along relatively separate paths over the last twenty years.
Trade and environmental issues began to collide with increasing frequency, how-
ever, in the early 1990s.1 In 1991, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 2
(GATT) panel issued a proposed report in which United States Marine Mammals
Protection Act (MMPA)3 restrictions on the importation of Mexican tuna caught
using fishing techniques harmful to dolphins were found to be inconsistent with
GATT article XI. 4 In 1990, the United States banned certain French wines because
they were fermented from grapes treated with procymidone-a Japanese pesticide
not properly registered for use in the United States. 5 The French Government
quickly charged that the U.S. action was not motivated by legitimate health and
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1. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS
AND OPPORTUNITIES, REP. OTA-BP-ITE-94 (May 26, 1992).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1987, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594. The panel decision was not appealed
to the GATT Council. Instead, Mexico moved to comply with the U.S. law that it had challenged
successfully before the GATT panel. Mexico's sudden, radical change in tactics appears to be moti-
vated by a desire to reduce U.S. concerns over the environmental impact of the NAFTA and, thereby,
increase the chances that the trade agreement will be ratified. Additionally, a second case has now been
brought against the United States by the European Community attacking the "secondary embargo"
provisions of the MMPA.
5. See Procymidone Residues in Wine; Request for Comment on Potential EPA Actions under
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,171 (1990).
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environmental concerns, but was instead merely a subterfuge to protect domestic
wine producers.
Against this backdrop of controversy, environmental issues were destined to
play a significant role as the United States, Mexico, and Canada moved to liberal-
ize regional trade through negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).6 Accordingly, when President Bush sought an extension of the U.S.
Trade Representative's authority to negotiate trade agreements on a fast track,7
Congress demanded assurances that the agreement would not weaken any current
environmental laws, regulations, or standards.8 The landmark trade agreement
that emerged from the fourteen months of negotiations, completed on August
12, 1992, contains a number of highly innovative provisions that may shape
environmentally sensitive language in future international trade agreements.
This article briefly catalogues and explains the ground-breaking nature of cer-
tain "green" provisions in the NAFTA. Thereafter, the article discusses some
of the most common criticisms leveled at the NAFTA for its treatment of environ-
mental concerns and what actions the new administration might undertake to
respond to these complaints. Finally, the article assesses how the NAFTA's
"green" language may impact future trade negotiations, with particular emphasis
on the renegotiation of the GATT.
I. The "Greening" of the NAFTA
The NAFTA's "green" provisions can be readily separated into six categories:
(1) preamble provisions, (2) standards-related measures, (3) sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, (4) dispute resolution/forum selection procedures, (5) preser-
vation of trade measures in international environmental agreements, and (6) envi-
ronmentally sensitive investment provisions. This article examines each in turn-
concentrating on the most novel and innovative provisions in each area.
6. North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA]. All references to the NAFTA
are to the October 7, 1992, draft. The fundamental goal of the NAFTA is to liberalize international
trade in services, goods, and investment among Mexico, Canada, and the United States. The means
selected to reach this goal include the eventual dismantling of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade
among the NAFTA partners.
7. In order to allow time for the negotiation of the NAFTA, Congress on May 24, 1991, extended
the fast-track procedures originally enacted in the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988), to
any trade agreement signed before July 1, 1993. Among other things, fast-track procedures require
the President to give Congress formal notice of his intent to enter into the agreement. President Bush
took this step on September 18, 1992. The 1974 Trade Act authorized the President to sign the
agreement 90 calendar days after giving notice to Congress, and President Bush signed the NAFTA
on December 17, 1992. At any time after signing, the President may submit legislation to Congress
implementing the trade agreement. The fast-track rules then require that both houses of Congress vote
on the agreement as submitted (without amendments) within 90 session days.
8. On May 1, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to Congress pledging, among other things, that
the NAFTA would not weaken any current U.S. law, regulation, or standard relating to the environ-
ment. See Dennis Eckart, Free Trade Shouldn't Mean Pollution, 9 ENVTL. F. 24 (1992).
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A. PREAMBLE
The preamble of the NAFTA sets out the principles and aspirations upon which
the Parties base the agreement. The NAFTA opens with an express recognition
of the importance of environmental concerns. In the preamble the Parties resolve
that trade liberalization and commercial expansion will be undertaken in an envi-
ronmentally sound manner. 9 The NAFTA text identifies the improvement of trade
"in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation" as
one of the agreement's primary goals.1 ° The Parties also commit to promote
"sustainable development" within their countries." This pledge reflects a recog-
nition that increased trade and investment under the NAFTA should be con-
sciously structured to avoid harm to the environment. Finally, the preamble
expresses the Parties' resolve to encourage the further development of environ-
mental laws and regulations, as well as to strengthen enforcement of environmen-
tal standards in each NAFTA country. These general goals-all novel elements
of a trade agreement-are given concrete expression in specific provisions of the
NAFTA text discussed below.
B. STANDARDS-RELATED MEASURES
The Standards-Related Measures or "Technical Standards" chapter is the cen-
terpiece of the "green language" in the NAFTA. This chapter applies to all human
health, safety, and environmental standards (other than sanitary and phytosanitary
standards), technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures in effect
in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Environmental, health, and safety
standards can function as inadvertent barriers to free trade. Goods manufactured
in one nation may contain constituents (for example, CFCs or pesticide residues)
that render the product unfit for sale under another nation's standards. To mini-
mize the interference with commerce, trade interests have sought to harmonize
environmental, health, and safety standards across borders. This effort at unifor-
mity has excited fears in the environmental community that industrial interests
will employ trade pacts to revisit and weaken domestic environmental standards.
Confronted with this tension, the NAFTA's Technical Standards chapter (and the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures subchapter discussed later) contains strong
language encouraging harmonization of domestic and international environmen-
9. NAFTA, supra note 6, preamble. Environmental concerns have been an important element
of the U.S. negotiating position in NAFTA talks since the very beginning of discussions. In February
1992 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative publicly released an environmental review of the
NAFTA that it had undertaken voluntarily in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies,
including the Environmental Protection Agency. The review examined the likely environmental effects
in the United States and Mexico of a NAFTA. In any future trade pact negotiations, environmental
groups will almost certainly press for a similar environmental review that results in formal recommen-
dations to the U.S. negotiators.
10. NAFTA, supra note 6, preamble.
11. Id.
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tal, health, and safety standards, but also clarifies that the NAFTA parties have
broad residual discretion to reject harmonization if necessary to ensure that the
NAFTA will not interfere with the integrity of domestic regulatory systems.
Article 905 of the NAFTA forcefully encourages the Parties to use international
measures when setting domestic standards that impact trade. Indeed, article 905(1)
essentially requires the use of international standards when these standards exist
or are in the final stages of development. Moreover, any Party employing an
international standard as a domestic technical measure enjoys the benefit of a
presumption that its use of the standard is consistent with the basic NAFTA
obligations and is not an improper attempt to utilize a technical standard to create
an unnecessary obstacle to trade. "
Article 906(2) further encourages each Party to act in the future to harmonize
its governmental regulations with the standards of the other NAFTA trading
partners. To facilitate this effort toward compatibility article 913 creates a Com-
mittee on Standards-Related Measures. The NAFTA Parties also must undertake
reasonable efforts to encourage domestic nongovernmental standard-setting bod-
ies to pursue comparability of their requirements with the standards and proce-
dures of other NAFTA nations.
Despite this strong language encouraging harmonization, the NAFTA takes
great pains to guarantee that trade expansion does not come at the expense of
the environment. First, article 905(3) ensures that any Party, or its political
subdivisions, can maintain domestic regulatory standards that it believes result in
higher levels of protection than would be provided under controlling international
measures. Accordingly, this provision eliminates any risk that the NAFTA could
lead to a "harmonization down" of domestic standards. Indeed, the Parties'
obligation to harmonize existing domestic standards is expressly conditioned on
the understanding that this can be achieved without "reducing the level of...
protection of ... animal or plant life or heath, [or] the environment ' 13 Once in
effect this provision will have a powerful positive impact on the North American
environment because it creates a one-way ratchet driving a "harmonization up-
ward" of all three nations' environmental standards.
Second, article 904(1) of the Technical Standards chapter expressly affirms
each country's basic right to maintain and enforce its own health, safety, and
environmental protection standards. This authority is, of course, a necessary
corollary of each of the NAFTA nation's ability to adopt domestic standards that
are more protective than international measures. As a means of implementing
article 904(1) rights the NAFTA expressly protects each nation's ability to prohibit
the importation of products that fail to meet domestic standards or that have not
yet completed the domestic approval process.
Third, the agreement authorizes Parties to depart from international standards
12. Id. art. 905(2).
13. Id. art. 906(2).
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in instances where those standards would be "ineffective" or "inappropriate." 4
Article 905 maintains maximum flexibility for the United States by recognizing
that otherwise relevant international standards might be inappropriate for a partic-
ular NAFTA Party because of climatic, geographic, technologic, scientific, or
infrastructure reasons.
Fourth, articles 909 and 1802 of the NAFTA contain "transparency" proce-
dures that will facilitate both international commerce and public participation in
environmental regulation. These provisions require that the NAFTA Parties give
public notice before adopting or modifying any environmental, health, and safety
measure (including sanitary and phytosanitary measures) that may affect trade. All
standards must be published and centrally available from a designated institution. 5
The broad availability of such information should enhance environmental protec-
tion by making it easier for industry to discover, understand, and comply with
relevant standards. Additionally, these procedural protections should address
environmentalists' fears that any NAFTA nation might quietly ease regulations
as a means of surreptitiously attracting investment.
Finally, the Technical Standards chapter maintains the Parties' flexibility in
conducting risk assessments-a fundamental building-block to environmental reg-
ulation. The NAFTA directly acknowledges each Party's right to determine the
level of risk that it considers acceptable when pursuing legitimate objectives of
protecting human health, environment, conservation, or safety. 6 The NAFTA
also specifically preserves important aspects of U.S. risk assessment procedures.
For example, the agreement recognizes the NAFTA nations' ability to consider
ecological risk as a relevant element of risk assessment. Additionally, the NAFTA
addresses the difficult problem of scientific uncertainty in risk assessment. In the
absence of adequate scientific information to make an informed risk assessment,
a Party remains free to adopt provisional regulations based on available informa-
tion.
C. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
Subchapter B of chapter 7 of the NAFTA addresses the development, adoption,
and enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Generally, these
measures are undertaken to protect humans, animals, or plants from risks arising
from animal or plant diseases and from dangers attendant to food additives or
contaminants. In these provisions the NAFTA again safeguards each Party's right
to regulate to protect human health and the environment, while simultaneously
seeking to prevent the abuse of such standards as disguised restrictions on trade.
The NAFTA takes several bold steps to ensure that the U.S. sanitary and
14. Id. art. 905(1).
15. Id. art. 909.
16. Id. arts. 904(2), 907.
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phytosanitary standards are not compromised. First, the NAFTA explicitly con-
firms each Party's right to establish the level of protection that it considers appro-
priate and to enact measures that are even more stringent than relevant interna-
tional standards.' 7 Moreover, the NAFTA preserves the authority of a nation's
governmental subentities (states, counties, and municipalities) to adopt environ-
mental measures more protective than national or international standards. Each
NAFTA partner can enforce its directed level of environmental protection by
prohibiting the entry of goods that do not satisfy relevant standards.
In an approach similar to that adopted in the Technical Standards chapter, the
NAFTA also encourages the Parties to harmonize their SPS measures with ac-
cepted international standards, without lowering their level of environmental
protection.'" For example, the NAFTA Parties pledge to promote the work of
several recognized organizations that review and develop international SPS stan-
dards.' 9 Similarly, each NAFTA nation must accept the SPS measures of its
partners as equivalent to its own, but only after the exporting country demonstrates
that the foreign standards achieve the importing nation's selected level of protec-
tion.2" Finally, the NAFTA creates a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures to facilitate these "harmonization" and "equivalence" efforts. 2' The
agreement also charges the committee with advancing technical cooperation and
consultations between the NAFTA Parties.22
SPS measures involve complex technical issues and might prove to be a fertile
field for disputes among the NAFTA partners during implementation. NAFTA
article 723 recognizes this potential for conflict and provides a dispute settlement
mechanism for sanitary and phytosanitary matters. In that dispute resolution
process, the NAFTA places the burden of proof squarely on the Party challenging
the protective measure.23
Viewed collectively, the Sanitary/Phytosanitary Standards and the Technical
Standards chapters negotiated in the NAFTA evidence a strong commitment that
the agreement will not compromise domestic public health, safety, and environ-
mental regulations. Properly implemented, they will serve as a potent engine for
enhanced environmental protection-driving upward harmonization of environ-
mental standards, yet preserving each NAFTA nation's authority to respond to
local conditions and concerns by adopting more protective environmental mea-
sures.
17. Id. arts. 712(1), 713(3).
18. Id. art. 712(1).
19. Id. art. 713(5).
20. Id. art. 714.
21. Id. art. 723.
22. Id. art. 723(2).
23. Id. art. 723(6).
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D. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Timing and fate conspired to guarantee that the dispute resolution process
employed when trade liberalization collides with environmental or conservation
regulations was certain to be a sensitive topic in the NAFTA negotiations. Just
as serious NAFTA discussions commenced, Mexico and the United States became
deeply embroiled in an acrimonious dispute concerning the application of U.S.
dolphin conservation legislation in a manner that restricted importation of Mexi-
can tuna. A GATT panel ultimately heard the dispute and issued a very controver-
sial decision, which has been extensively criticized by American environmental
interests. 4 Against this backdrop the NAFTA partners sought to fashion dispute
settlement procedures that would be expeditious and effective, but also highly
responsive to environmental concerns.
The NAFTA contemplates a three-step dispute resolution process. The first
step is formal consultation.25 Each Party has the right to prompt consultation
on any matter that could affect the Party's NAFTA rights.26 In the event that
consultation fails to resolve the matter within forty-five days, any Party has the
right to call a meeting of the Free Trade Commission with all three Parties
participating .27 The Commission must act promptly to seek settlement using what-
ever means of dispute resolution that it believes is appropriate.28 If a mutual
settlement still proves impossible, any nation involved in the dispute may initiate
an arbitral panel proceeding.2 9 Usually a panel will make findings of fact, deter-
mine whether the challenged action is inconsistent with NAFTA obligations, and
recommend a specific resolution of the dispute.30 The panel will present a final
report to the Commission for publication within fifteen days. 3' After reviewing
the panel report the disputing Parties must agree to a resolution of the matter,
which ordinarily will be consistent with the recommendations of the panel.32
The NAFTA takes three very significant steps to guarantee that this dispute
settlement process is environmentally sensitive. First, the NAFTA sanitary and
phytosanitary provisions place upon the complaining nation the burden of proving
that a challenged environmental or health measure is inconsistent with the
24. The panel decision has not yet been formally adopted by the GATT Council. In any event,
the decision would not override the domestic law because GATT rules allow the United States to offer
other trade concessions and to continue to enforce the offending statutory trade restrictions.
25. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2006(1).
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 2007(1)(b).
28. Id. art. 2007(4).
29. Id. art. 2008(1).
30. Id. art. 2016(2).
31. "Unless the Commission decides otherwise, the final report of the panel shall be published
15 days after it is transmitted to the Commission." NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2017(4). The U.S.
environmental community has expressed concern that the Free Trade Commission may elect not to
make public a final panel report.
32. Id. art. 2017.
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agreement.33 In this regard the NAFTA process differs from traditional GATT
rules, which place upon the Party defending a domestic SPS regulation the burden
of establishing that its regulatory provision, though inconsistent with the GATT,
should qualify for an article XX exemption and is not an improper obstacle to
international trade.34
Second, the NAFTA Parties recognized that disputes concerning environmental
regulation often involve highly technical, scientific evaluations and require com-
plex fact-finding. To address this problem the NAFTA ensures that arbitral panels
have meaningful access to expert advice and interested Parties. The dispute settle-
ment panel, on its own initiative or at the request of a disputing Party, may request
a written report from an independent scientific review board or seek the views
of nongovernmental groups.35 This provision creates, for the first time in a trade
agreement, a formal mechanism that provides trade experts facing an environmen-
tal issue with the scientific and environmental expertise that they require to make
a fully informed decision. The NAFTA obligates the panel to take the report into
account in reaching its final decision and to release the report in conjunction with
a publicly available final decision.36
Third, the NAFTA adopts a special forum selection provision for environmen-
tal disputes arising under chapters 7 and 9 or those related to the mandatory
trade provisions of certain specified international environmental or conservation
agreements. Generally under the NAFTA, the country challenging another Par-
ty's actions or standards has the opportunity either to bring its challenge within
the NAFTA dispute resolution measures outlined above or to proceed before a
GATT panel.3 7 If the dispute concerns environmental, health, safety, or conserva-
tion standards, however, the defending Party may force the matter into the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the more environmentally sensitive NAFTA settlement sys-
tem.3" The ability of the Party defending an environment-based obstacle to
international trade to vest jurisdiction in the NAFTA dispute resolution regime
marks a significant departure from previous trade pacts. The U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, for example, grants the complaining nation unfettered discre-
tion to select the GATT forum. Guaranteeing the Party defending an environmen-
tal measure access to the more environmentally sensitive NAFTA dispute resolu-
tion provisions ensures that the burden of proof stays on the complaining nation
and allows full use of scientific review boards. In short, these three unprecedented
33. Id. art. 723(6).
34. GATT, supra note 2, article XX authorizes countries to impose environmental, health, and
safety measures otherwise inconsistent with the GATT, so long as these measures are not arbitrary,
are not a disguised trade barrier, or do not unjustifiably discriminate against foreign products.
35. NAFTA, supra note 6, arts. 2014, 2015.
36. Id. art. 2015.
37. Id. art. 2005(1).
38. See id. arts. 2003-2020.
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innovations ensure that environmental concerns are carefully evaluated along with
trade issues during dispute settlements.
E. PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (IEAs)
Article 104 clarifies the relationship between the NAFTA and current interna-
tional environmental and conservation agreements. Generally, the NAFTA takes
priority over other international agreements to the extent that there is any con-
flict. 39 However, article 104(l) provides an exception to that general rule. This
article ensures that the NAFTA does not interfere with the existing mandatory
trade provisions-including trade sanctions and restrictions-contained in several
important international environmental agreements. This exemption specifically
extends to: (1) the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species
(commonly known as CITES); 40 (2) the Montreal Protocol (concerning ozone-
depleting substances) ;41 (3) the Basel Convention (concerning hazardous sub-
stances);42 and (4) two enumerated Basel-compatible bilateral waste agreements
between the United States and each of Canada and Mexico. The agreement also
allows for an exchange of letters among the Parties as a simple mechanism to
bring within the scope of the exemption any future international environmental
or conservation agreement.43
Article 104 guarantees the supremacy of the trade obligations of these
agreements even when they directly conflict with the NAFTA. However, the
NAFTA obligates the Parties, in implementing the trade-related provisions of
these agreements, to select the implementation alternative least inconsistent with
the NAFTA, so long as the options under consideration are all "equally effective
and reasonably available." -4 This condition ensures that the enumerated interna-
tional environmental or conservation agreements-while fully enforced-are
implemented, where there is a choice, in a manner that minimizes the disruption
of the NAFTA's regional trade system.
F. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INVESTMENT
The NAFTA is expected to generate considerable investment throughout North
America by removing many existing investment barriers. The agreement contains
a special section on the relationship between investment and environmental re-
39. Id. art. 103.
40. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar.
3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
41. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1550, amended and adjusted, 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991).
42. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657. It is noteworthy that the Basel Convention is listed
in the NAFTA, but the United States has not yet formally ratified this international agreement.
43. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 104(2).
44. Id. art. 104(1)
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quirements. 45 In that article the NAFTA takes several steps to advance environ-
mentally sensitive investment and to discourage the relaxation of environmental
standards as a means of attracting investment.
First, article 11 14(1) affirms the Parties' understanding that the NAFTA should
not be construed to prevent government intervention to encourage environmen-
tally sensitive investment. Accordingly, the Parties remain free to adopt and
enforce measures to ensure that investors consider environmental concerns.46 For
example, the NAFTA preserves the Parties' ability to require environmental
impact statements for any new investment. However, the agreement commits the
exact nature of the protective measures to be adopted, if any, to the discretion of
each NAFTA nation. 47 The sole significant qualification on the Parties' authority
is that environmental measures enacted or enforced by the Parties must apply with
equal force to both domestic and foreign investors.
Second, the NAFTA text expresses tripartite agreement that it is "inappropriate
to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental
measures." 48 Consistent with this understanding, the NAFTA Parties further
undertake not to entice investment by waiving or otherwise derogating existing
environmental laws or standards. 49 As a means of enforcing this trilateral commit-
ment against the creation of "pollution havens," the NAFTA partners pledge to
consult if any Party feels a prohibited environmental subsidy has been granted or
offered.5 °
Although a violation of article 1114 does not trigger formal dispute resolution
procedures under the NAFTA, the inclusion of environmentally sensitive lan-
guage in the Investment chapter of a trade agreement is unprecedented. In combi-
nation these provisions should provide the NAFTA nations with a strong impetus
to utilize the investment that trade liberalization will naturally generate to advance
environmental protection.
II. But Not "Green" Enough?
Despite the many environmentally sensitive provisions outlined above, signifi-
cant elements of the U.S. environmental community have roundly criticized the
NAFTA as inadequate in its response to the environmental risks posed by liberal-
ized trade with Canada and Mexico. President Clinton has responded to these
attacks by conditioning his support for the NAFTA on the adoption of a supple-
mental agreement further addressing environmental issues among the three na-
45. Id. ch. 11.
46. Id. art. 1114(2).
47. Id. art. 1114(1).
48. Id. art. 1114(2).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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tions. 51 The exact contours of any supplemental agreement are not clear at this
time. It is possible, however, to identify several of the most common environmen-
tal criticisms of the NAFTA text and to evaluate likely responses by the Clinton
administration.
A. FAILURE TO ENSURE STRONG ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT IN MEXICO
In early 1991 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Office of General
Counsel evaluated Mexico's environmental laws and regulations. The EPA expert
legal analysis concluded that Mexico's environmental laws, regulations, and stan-
dards are in many respects similar to those in the United States and could readily
provide "an effective framework for a meaningful environmental protection pro-
gram in Mexico." 52 This review also determined, however, that U.S. and Mexi-
can Government practices differ most significantly in the area of compliance,
monitoring, and enforcement. 53 Thus, the environmental protection challenge
facing Mexico is not so much one of enacting strong environmental laws, but
instead one of enforcing and implementing the laws already on the books.
The American environmental community recognized the absence of a well-
grounded environmental enforcement tradition in Mexico and viewed the NAFTA
as a vehicle to address this problem. Similarly, organized labor interests expressed
concern that manufacturers would relocate jobs to Mexico to exploit its less
vigorous environmental enforcement system.54 The NAFTA's text does not, how-
ever, deal with the enforcement of environmental laws. Instead, enforcement has
been addressed through a series of bilateral efforts between the United States and
Mexico commonly referred to as "parallel track" activities.
These bilateral efforts have led the Mexican Government to significantly in-
crease funding for environmental enforcement. For example, Mexico has in-
creased fourfold the number of professionally trained environmental inspectors
since 1989.56 Indeed, some 200 environmental inspectors now exist in the Mexican
states on the U.S. border. 57 Additionally, Mexico's principal federal environmental
agency, SEDESOL, has been reorganized to establish a separate environmental
51. Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at the Student Center at North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, N.C. 15 (Oct. 4, 1992); Gerald F. Seib, Clinton Backs the North American Trade Pact, But
Candidate's Stances on Issue Aren't Clear, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1992, at A14.
52. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION
OF MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS: INTERIM REPORT OF EPA FINDINGS at ii
(Nov. 22, 1991).
53. Id. at ii-iii.
54. Keith Schneider, Trade Pact vs. Environment: Clash at a House Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1992, at D1.
55. The name derives from the fact that these efforts have proceeded simultaneously with the
negotiation of the NAFTA.
56. Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (Summary), Feb. 1992, at 21.
57. Id.
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prosecutor's office. Not surprisingly, the reorganization and increased resources
have yielded increasingly aggressive environmental enforcement activities. Be-
tween January and May of 1992 the Mexican Government inspected seventy-five
industrial facilities for environmental violations-resulting in the temporary clo-
sure of thirty-five plants and the permanent shutdown of one facility.58 In June 1992
the United States and Mexico simultaneously announced clusters of cooperative
environmental enforcement actions. 59Mexico's actions involved forty-two facility
inspections, resulting in seven temporary partial plant closings, one temporary total
closing, twenty-two notices of violation, and four forfeitures of surety bonds.
60
As these and other enforcement actions illustrate, Mexico is building the infra-
structure and political resolve needed to impose serious penalties on companies
that violate Mexican environmental laws. As the Clinton administration moves
to negotiate supplemental agreements in support of the NAFTA, the United States
Government will likely attempt to nurture this positive trend in Mexican environ-
mental enforcement. To ensure against backsliding, however, some environmen-
talists have boldly called for the creation of a multinational commission with
unprecedented, extraterritorial "authority to halt polluting activities" within the
NAFTA countries and to "provid[e] appropriate remedies to those harmed" by
illegal pollution. 6' Since this radical approach has serious implications for the
sovereignty of the NAFTA nations, its ultimate adoption seems unlikely. Instead,
Congress may enact NAFTA implementing legislation that reinstitutes (or "snaps
back") tariffs if Mexico fails to enforce aggressively its environmental laws.
"Snap back" tariffs could be viewed as one mechanism to implement Vice Presi-
dent Gore's suggestion that "weak and ineffectual enforcement of pollution con-
trol measures .. .be included in the definition of unfair trade practices. ,62
Alternatively, any supplemental agreement might merely continue and expand
the considerable, existing U.S. Government technical assistance effort to Mexican
environmental enforcement authorities. During the debate on implementing legis-
lation for the NAFTA, Congress will need to decide what, if any, specific sanc-
tions must be available to the United States should Mexico become lax in its
environmental enforcement.
B. INADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE BORDER ENVIRONMENT
Another common point of criticism aimed at the NAFTA centers on its failure
to deal directly with the 2000-mile border between the United States and Mexico.
58. William K. Reilly, The Greening of NAFTA: Implications for Continental Environmental
Cooperation in North America, 2 J. ENV'T & DEV. 1, 8 (Winter 1993).
59. STATE/FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR U.S.-MEXiCO BORDER POLLUTERS, EPA Ac-
TIVITIES UPDATE, June 15, 1992, at 1.
60. Id.
61. Letter from the Center for International Environmental Law to Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans, International Environment & Scientific Affairs 2 (Nov. 18, 1992).
62. AL GoRE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 343 (1993).
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The NAFTA turned a spotlight on the considerable environmental problems in
the border region. In the last decade, population in the border area has more
than doubled as Mexican workers flocked to jobs in maquiladora plants.63 This
population explosion has severely overtaxed the border environment. In particu-
lar, the border has become spotted with colonias-numerous small, unofficial
communities on both sides of the border that typically lack sewage treatment
or adequate drinking water treatment facilities. Additionally, environmentalists
allege that many maquiladora plants violate environmental requirements by gen-
erating excessive emissions and improperly disposing of hazardous waste.
64
Environmentalists correctly note that the text of the NAFTA itself does not
contain provisions designed to remedy the environmental ills of the border region.
As is the case with identified weaknesses in Mexico's environmental enforcement
program, the NAFTA leaves the long-term solutions to concrete environmental
problems along the border to bilateral "parallel" efforts between the United
States and Mexico.
In the 1983 Border Environment Agreement (the La Paz Agreement) Mexico
and the United States established an international structure to support an extensive
program of bilateral environmental cooperation. Working within that structure,
the two countries released in February 1992 a detailed, integrated plan for environ-
mental protection and cleanup along the border.65 The border plan initiates a wide
spectrum of environmental protection initiatives, including programs to protect
drinking water supplies, to improve enforcement of environmental laws, to ex-
pand wastewater treatment facilities, to improve the management of hazardous
and solid waste, to facilitate emergency response, and to develop a better database
on the border environment. To pursue these programs Mexico has earmarked
$460 million to address border pollution problems over the next three years,6
The Bush administration met Mexico's pledge with a corresponding promise
to more than double federal expenditures for the border in fiscal year 1993 to
approximately $241 million.67
Border issues will almost certainly be addressed in any supplemental environ-
mental agreements negotiated by the Clinton administration to facilitate the ratifi-
63. Maquiladora facilities are assembly plants that operate in a designated zone on the Mexican
side of the border. Mexican law allows maquiladora plants to import materials into Mexico without
paying duties, so long as they export the finished products.
64. See Robert Tomsho, Environmental Posse Fights a Lonely War Along the Rio Grande,
WALL Sr. J., Nov. 10, 1992, at Al (citing a 1989 congressional study finding that only 33 of 600
maquiladoras operating across from Texas had registered to transport hazardous waste back into the
United States for disposal, as required by law).
65. Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (First Stage, 1992-94)
(Feb. 1992).
66. News Conference with William Reilly, EPA Administrator: North American Free Trade
Agreement, Fed. News Service, Aug. 13, 1992, at 2, available in LEXIS, FEDCOM Library,
FEDNEW File [hereinafter Reilly Statement].
67. Congress, however, refused to appropriate the full amount of President Bush's budget request
for Border projects and, instead, reduced the amount funded by approximately $100 million. Id.
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cation of the NAFTA. Once again the supplemental agreement will most likely
endorse the considerable efforts at bilateral cooperation already under way and
pledge continued financial and political support. Additionally, any supplemental
bilateral agreement might profitably clarify the NAFTA's impact on the maquila-
dora program.6" If further steps are perceived necessary, the new administration
may push Mexico into even more ambitious programs to protect shared natural
resources such as the Gulf of Mexico. Some in Congress have suggested the
bolder action of imposing a temporary tax on the increased cross-border com-
merce generated by the NAFTA and placing the proceeds in a cleanup trust fund
dedicated to the U.S.-Mexico border environment.6 9
HI. A Model for Future Trade Agreements?
Despite these criticisms of the NAFTA's "green" provisions, the NAFTA is,
as former EPA Administrator William K. Reilly has stated, "the most environ-
mentally sensitive.., free trade agreement ever negotiated anywhere.'"70 Accord-
ingly, the environmental community is profoundly committed to including the
NAFTA's "green" provisions as an irreducible minimum in all future trade
pacts.71 Furthermore, environmentalists can expect some support for their efforts
from Vice President Al Gore, who believes that "environmental standards must
be included among the criteria for deciding when to liberalize trading arrange-
ments. ,72
The continuing Uruguay Round of the GATT talks presents the most immediate
opportunity for environmental interests to pursue their reform agenda. The ex-
isting GATT largely ignores environmental issues. 73 When the GATT was origi-
nally signed in 1947, environmental issues simply were not in the forefront of
social concerns. GATT Parties did establish a Working Party on Environmental
Measures and International Trade in 1971, but that effort lay dormant for many
years until it was recently revitalized in response to heightened concerns over the
environmental impacts of liberalized trade and the GATT's effect on international
conservation agreements.
As GATT negotiations continue, environmentalists can be expected to press
for a broad spectrum of changes to accommodate ecological issues-many of
68. See Robert Heckart & Tira Harpaz, Critics Ask If NAFTA Is "Green" Enough, 15 NAT'L
L.J. 17, 20 & n.16 (Dec. 21, 1992).
69. 138 CONG. REC. S6642 (daily ed. May 14, 1992) (statement of Sen. Baucus); Id. at E3091
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Matsui).
70. Reilly Statement, supra note 66, at 1 (emphasis in original).
71. Cf. Robert Keatley, Activist Groups Seek to Influence Clinton as He Starts to Shape U.S.
Trade Policies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1992, at A6.
72. GoRE, supra note 62, at 343.
73. Kyle McSlarrow, It's a Matter of Perspective, 9 ENVTL. F. 27, 28 (1992).
VOL. 27, NO. 3
NAFTA: "GREEN" LANGUAGE 705
which will mirror the "green" provisions of the NAFTA. 74 First, the "Dunkel
Text ' 75 contained a strong endorsement of international "harmonization" of
environmental, health, and safety standards. Predictably, the environmental com-
munity labeled "harmonization" as an attempt to "compel the United States to
weaken its [domestic] standards in these areas.' ,76 Environmental interests can be
expected to demand that the GATT include protections against downward pressure
on U.S. environmental standards similar to those found in the Standards-Related
Measures and SPS chapters of the NAFTA.
Second, the GATT interpretation underlying the Tuna/Dolphin decision will
be targeted for revision. The GATT panel decision in the Tuna/Dolphin matter
essentially determined that unilateral trade sanctions against foreign goods pro-
duced by environmentally harmful practices were "GATT-illegal. "77 Environ-
mentalists will seek to ensure that the GATT is reinterpreted or amended to allow
countries to act unilaterally to adopt quotas, tariffs, trade sanctions, or other
punitive measures to advance environmental goals.78
Third, environmental advocates will press to deal with the tension between the
GATT and the trade obligations imposed by several international conservation
and environmental conventions. 79 These international conventions typically utilize
discriminatory trade measures to sanction violations. GATT officials have sug-
gested that these practices may run afoul of the Tuna/Dolphin panel's reasoning, o
In order to preserve hard-fought gains in these treaties, environmentalists will
almost certainly seek an express recognition that trade obligations under interna-
tional conventions on the environment take precedence over contradictory GATT
provisions, similar to the deference afforded these treaties under NAFTA article
104.1 Even such a broad "trumping" of the GATT by international environmen-
74. For a different perspective on the necessity of modifying the GATT, see Richard B. Stewart,
International Trade and Environmental Issues: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1329, 1349 (1992) ("the current GATT text provides sufficient flexibility to afford
environmental values equal footing with free trade values").
75. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991), reprinted in "THE DUNKEL DRAFT" FROM
THE GATT SECRETARIAT (The Institute for International Legal Information ed., 1992). The "Dunkel
Text" is a colloquial reference to the proposed text offered by GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel
as a vehicle to conclude the Uruguay Round of the GATT discussions.
76. See Alex Hittle, Trade and the Environment at an Impasse, 9 ENVTL. F. 26, 27 (1992).
77. Ralf Buckley, Trade and Environment: Will NAFTA Improve on GATT?, 22 ENVTL. POL'Y
& L. 327 (1992); John Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1242-45 (1992).
78. See Hittle, supra note 76, at 26-27.
79. See Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development:
A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 535, 580-84 (1992).
80. Steve Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF.
203, 216 (1992).
81. Daniel C. Esty, New Linkages and Policy Challenges, 9 ENVTL. F. 24, 25 (1992); Jackson,
supra note 77, at 1244-45 & n.51.
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tal agreements, however, leaves complex questions concerning the system's abil-
ity to interfere with the GATT rights of a nonsignatory to a specific convention.
IV. Conclusion
As a major congressional debate looms, the future of the NAFTA depends not
only on the perceived adequacy of the "green" provisions within the document
itself, but also on the extent to which "parallel track" initiatives are viewed as
addressing the entire spectrum of environmental issues raised by the NAFTA.
Regardless of the outcome, the NAFTA's permanent impact on international trade
policy and law appears beyond question. The U.S. environmental community,
awakened by the GATT panel decision in Tuna/Dolphin, has leveraged its domes-
tic political strength to secure unprecedented "green" provisions in the NAFTA
and a pledge from the new President for further environmental concessions in
accompanying supplemental agreements. s2 Emboldened by this success, ecologi-
cal activists will certainly press for similar provisions in future regional trade
pacts and in the ongoing GATT negotiations. The many ground-breaking "green"
provisions of the NAFTA are likely to serve as a model for the intelligent integra-
tion of environmental and commercial concerns into the next century.83 If this
integration occurs, the NAFTA may mark not only a significant step forward in
international commerce, but also remarkable progress in the wise reconciliation
of conflicting environmental and trade interests.
82. See Seib, supra note 51 (noting Clinton's "sensitiv[ity] to ... voices in his party [including]
environmental groups worried about the treaty").
83. Recognizing the precedential nature of the NAFTA, then-EPA Administrator Reilly testified
before Congress that he "firmly believe[d] that for some time to come, when other nations negotiate
with their neighbors to open up markets, NAFTA will be their model for dealing with related
environmental issues." Hearing on the North American Free Trade Agreement Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 102-03 (Sept. 15, 1992) (statement of William
K. Reilly).
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